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     On 11 September 2001, terrorists, in hijacked commercial aircraft, smashed into the W rld 
Trade Center complex in New York City.  Nearly three thousand people died as a result of this 
action.  The President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of 
Central Intelligence, and Attorney General were quick to go before the American people and 
condemn this act of treachery.  Calls for justice were quick and many, and the American people 
came together in a chorus of condemnation of those responsible.  On 11 September 1973, the 
President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of Central 
Intelligence, and Attorney General, helped facilitate the rise to power of General Augusto 
Pinochet as the new President of Chile.  It is estimated that 2,800-5,000 people died as a result of 
this action.  There was no condemnation for this act of treachery.  In fact the American public 
was unaware of the actions of the United States Government so there was never a cry for justice.  
The actions of the United States government would become public knowledge twenty-six year  
later.  
     In February 1999, President William J. Clinton declassified the documents associated with the 
operation that put Pinochet into power, and the public slowly started to become aware of what 
our government had done.  This CIA operation, code named FUBELT, was put into action 
despite the fact that President Salvador Allende posed no threat to the United States. These 
documents, many of which are cited herein, show a blatant disregard of the United States 
government's own ideology and policies regarding democracy, as well as its disregard of the 
United Nations (U.N.) documents that it signed to guarantee a right of self det rmination.  The 
disregard of these rights that the United States has agreed to under the U.N. charter and the rights 
to a free and democratic society as guaranteed by our own Constitution are the heart of the 
hypocrisy of United States foreign policy.  There are many examples of this hypocrisy in foreign 
Huggins 
2 
 
policy, in numerous countries in virtually every region of the world.  This paper will look at just 
one of those examples, the United States involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador 
Allende of Chile.1   
     On the 26th of June, 1945 the United States signed the United Nations charter.  Chapter 1, 
Article 1, paragraph 2 states clearly the following rationale for the organizations existence, and 
commits the signatories: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace."2  The right to self-determination was one of the 
founding principles of the United States' War of Independence as well as the nation's 
Constitution.  Why would the United States undertake an operation that goes against these very 
principles? What had Allende done that made him a target of the United States?   
     The actions that President Richard Nixon and his administration took against Salvador 
Allende and Chile were directly related to, or derived from, policies and actions of his 
predecessors. To understand the how and why of the United States involvement in Chile, we 
must look at those actions and policies undertaken by the Presidents of the containme t 
generation.  The Cold War, and the policies that arose from it, shaped United States foreign 
policy immediately following World War II, and for decades thereafter.  As the war came to a 
close, two powers stood at polar ends of the political spectrum: the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  Having seen the Soviet Union take control of Eastern Europe, the fear of future 
Communist expansion became the impetus for "containment" of communism, and the domino 
theory as the basis of United States foreign policy for the next quarter centu y. President Truman 
became the first of the containment generation Presidents.  His containment policies included 
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The Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.3 
      In October of 1949 the Chinese Revolution put Mao Zedong into power and created a 
Communist China.  This was seen as a serious setback to the United States foreign policy of 
containment and left Truman with the label of the President who "lost" China. 
     In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President.  Stopping the spread of 
communism, and containing the Communist desire for world supremacy remained the top 
priority for American foreign policy.4   Under Eisenhower's New Look policy, the United States 
would take any actions it deemed necessary in order to keep the current balance of powr in its 
favor.  It was during the Eisenhower administration that the CIA became a major player in 
United States foreign policy.  This administration and those that followed initiated covert 
operations into foreign territories through the CIA.  In 1959, at the end of Eisenhower's 
presidency, the Cuban Revolution took place and had a profound effect on the entire Latin 
American region.   
      The effects of the recent Cuban Revolution swept through virtually all Latin American 
countries, and was something that the new administration under John F. Kennedy had to deal 
with.5  Because of its impact, the Cuban Revolution played a key role in determining future 
American foreign policy responses in Latin America.  Cuba and Latin America be ame the 
impetus for many of the programs and policies under Kennedy, policies that allowed the 
containment and the domino theories to obtained new heights.  Kennedy did not want to be seen 
as weak on communism, or to become the next President to lose a country to the perceived threat 
of Communist expansion. Under President Kennedy, the policy of  "flexible response" replaced 
Eisenhower's New Look policy.  Flexible response expanded the conventional militry forces 
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greatly, and placed special emphasis on the establishment of special forces units such as the 
Green Berets.6  According to Fraser and Murray the last policy in the containment of Communist 
expansion, especially in Latin America, was "United States support for anti-Communist forces 
plotting to overthrow actual pro- or suspected Communist governments in Central and South 
America."7  This policy became the key to President Richard Nixon's response to the election of 
Salvador Allende in Chile.  
     Who was Salvador Allende and how did he become the target of the Nixon administration? 
Salvador Allende Gossens was born in Valparaíso, Chile on 26 June 1908.  His family was 
considered upper class and had a history of being involved in politics.  In 1932 Allende 
graduated from the University of Chile with a degree in medicine.   It was during his college 
years, while working part time with the ambulance service, that Allende would witness the 
effects of deep impoverishment and illiteracy in Chile.   His desire to help the poor and his social 
conscience pushed him into politics and made him the Marxist he became.8  In 1956 Allende's 
coalition became the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), and in 1958 he served as the party's 
candidate for the presidency.  Allende did much better in the 1958 election than he had in the 
previous Presidential election, receiving 29 percent of the popular vote versus 6 percent in 1952.  
Because of his narrow defeat and his Marxist ideology, Allende attracted a lot of attention 
amongst officials in Washington D.C..   In 1964 Allende ran once more for President.  Unlike the 
previous elections in which three or more candidates had run, the 1964 election saw only Allende
and Eduardo Frei running against each other.  Allende represented the left and was again the 
candidate of FRAP.  Frei represented the center and right and was the candidate of the Christian 
Democrats.  Conservatives and liberals that were allied with the radical elements of the right had 
no desire to see a Marxist candidate in power.   To eliminate this possibility they broke away 
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from their alliance and allowed their supporters to vote for Frei. With a Marxist candidate on one 
hand and a democratic candidate on the other, the United States could not let Allende win.  The 
Johnson administration tasked the CIA with helping the Frei campaign. To accomplish the 
mission, the CIA covertly contributed millions in financial support to Frei's campaign.  Frei went 
on to win the election.  This marked the first time-certainly not the last-that he United States  
involved itself in an Allende related election. In 1970, Salvador Allende ran for President again, 
this time for his own Unidad Popular (People's Unity) coalition.  The 1970 election was a return 
to a three candidate election and Allende won this election but not with a clear majority.  Allende 
received 36.5 percent of the vote, Jorge Allesandri got 35.2 percent and the third candidate 
Radomiro Tomic received 28.0 percent.  Under the Chilean Constitution, if no candidate receiv s 
a majority, congress would choose the winner of the election.  This set in motion the events that 
led to the overthrow of Allende and demonstrated, once again, the hypocrisy of American 
foreign policy. 
     To say that the United States was the sole contributing element that led to the overt row of 
Allende would be inaccurate.  Salvador Allende's political ambitions, as well as his ctions, or in 
some cases his inaction, were all contributing factors to his own downfall.  Historian Thomas 
Wright points out several of Allende's contributory actions and non-action.  First was the hyper 
mobilization of rural and working classes. This created significant problems for Allende as rural 
peasants had taken Allende's agrarian reform into their own hands to occupy large est tes and 
urban workers had taken action as well by seizing factories. The problem for Allende was a 
question of what or what not to do about it. Allende waivered on action against his own people 
as his government was a peoples government.  On the other side of the fence Allende belived
that he needed to enforce the laws of the land.  Wright says, "On one hand Allende had 
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Constitutional responsibility as President to enforce the law, which of course g aranteed private 
ownership rights until valid expropriation order was given. On the other hand the workers wer  
Allende’s constituency, and for ideological as well as practical reasons he was understandably 
loathe to use force of a "people's" government against the people."9  S condly there existed a 
power struggle between the President and congress as congressional impeachments of Allende 
appointed cabinet ministers took place.  Chile's congress and judiciary branch had no sympathy 
for Allende's Marxist objectives and showed this by refusing to pass bills brought frth by his 
UP coalition. Thirdly there were mounting economic problems such as shortages of food and 
other consumer goods and inflation that reached 300 percent. These economic problems were 
exacerbated by Track II operations.  Chile's radical left wing, the Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left (MIR), continued to radicalize and mobilize the lower classes.  Furthermore 
the MIR wanted, and advocated in actions, Allende to take bigger and bolder steps.  As Allende 
continued to nationalize the Chilean economy and the United States economic warfaretook its 
toll, the support of the middle class was fading away.  The gremios, Chile’s economic and 
profession associations, launched the 1972 truckers strike to protest nationalization of the 
trucking sector that shutdown the provisioning to cities.  In addition, a second strike on July25, 
1973, was designed to totally shut down the economy for as long as necessary to remove 
Allende.  Both strikes were supported financially by the CIA as part of itscovert destabilization 
plan.  Joining the gremios were Chilean housewives in the "marches of the empty pots", 
demonstrations by students and general street agitation.  Along with all the violence, economic 
warfare, and a political impasse, the MIR and Allende's last move brought the coup climate to 
critical mass and provide the impetus for the Chilean military to move against Allende.  
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      Chilean Naval intelligence had uncovered a plot that sailors in two cities were planning to 
mutiny against their commanders.  With this information they accused the MIR, Socialist 
Senator Carlos Altamirano and the Movement for Unitary Popular Action Deputy Oscar 
Garretón with plotting the mutiny.  Allende's last move, unfortunately, coincided with the 
"discovery" of the mutiny plot.  Allende decided to replace officers in various strategic positions 
within the Chilean military with officers that he was confident in.  Prior to this action, Allende 
had taken a hands off approach with the military.  This would be the first time that he would use 
his powers as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.   
     Scholarship written in the first few years after the coup are good sources on events within 
Chile.  During this period the most influential scholars in the field  included  Paul Sigmund, 
Elizabeth Farnsworth, James Petras and Morley Morris,  The documents released in 1999 
changed the accuracy and scope of many of these secondary sources.10  For the purpose of this 
paper, I have primarily utilized secondary sources written after  President Clinton's release of the 
Chilean documents.   Influential authors from this period include Peter Kornbluh, Lubna Zakia 
Qureshi, and Thomas Wright. 
     Against the backdrop of the Cold War, superpower one-upmanship, domino theory, and 
Communist containment polices of the four preceding administrations, the Nixon admi istration 
had to deal with the election of an openly Marxist President and a Marxist-oriented gov rnment 
in Chile.  President Richard Nixon was not going to let another Cuba happen in Latin America. 
Qureshi  summed it up well when she stated that President Nixon was "shaped by cultural 
prejudice and influence by the legacy of his predecessors" and that he "looked on political 
developments in Chile with proprietary interest."11  As mentioned earlier the actions that 
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President Richard Nixon and his administration took against Salvador Allende and Chile were 
directly related to, or derived from, policies and actions of his predecessors.     
     The democratically elected Chilean President, Marxist Salvador Allende, took office on 3 
November 1970.  Despite the fact that the United States Government intelligence and diplomatic 
assessments had determined that Allende posed no threat to the security of the United States, 
nothing would stop the Nixon administration from being the force behind the efforts to try to 
keep him from being seated as the new President, or his subsequent removal from office if 
inaugurated.   
      On 15 September 1970, President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, and Attorney Gneral John Mitchell met 
in the Oval Office, to discuss United States policy toward Allende and Chile.  It was reported 
that President Nixon was very angry and was concerned that if Allende became the new Chilean 
President that communism would spread throughout Latin America.  Qureshi theorizes that, 
"What probably intensified his paranoia about Allende's Unidad Popular and other Latin 
American nationalist movements was the most successful one of all, Castro's Cuban 
experiment."12  During this meeting Nixon stressed that he wanted to prevent Allende from being 
inaugurated.  Handwritten notes taken by DCI Helms showed the beginning of United States 
intervention into Chilean internal affairs.  The handwritten notes from this meeting became the 
Presidential directive regarding actions to be undertaken in Chile.  The notes provide insight to 
President Nixon and his disregard for Chilean sovereignty. 
The notes state:  
One in 10 chance, perhaps, 
but save Chile: 
Worth Spending 
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Not concerned risks involved 
No involvement of Embassy 
$10,000,000 available, more 
if necessary 
full-time job-best men 
we have 
game plan 
make the economy scream 
48 hours plan of action13  
The next day, 16 September 1970, DCI Helms met with high agency officials of covert 
operations to discuss options.  Minutes of this first meeting note that the CIA must prepare an 
action plan for National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger within 48 hours. 
 “The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende 
Regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States.  The President  
asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. 
The President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed.  Further 
The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments 
Of State and Defense.”14 
Here we see written documentation of President Nixon's disregard of our own gover ment's 
ideology and policies regarding democracy, as well as the U.N. documents that it signed to 
guarantee a right of self determination.  Proof that United States  foreign polcy is hypocritical 
and is meant as a tool for the United States to get its way through intervention.   The CIA Plan 
that evolved out of this meeting was one that consisted of dual actions, known as Track I and 
Track II, both running concurrently.  This plan was given the codename FUBELT.  Kissinger 
and the CIA immediately implemented FUBELT in order to comply with the directive of the 
President.  Oversight of the operation was handled through the 40 Committee.  The 40 
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Committee supervised all intelligence operations that were undertaken on behalf of t e White 
House.  
     Track I is said to have originated on June 18, 1970 when Ambassador Edward Korry 
proposed to the 40 Committee that a contingency fund of $250,000 be established in order to 
bribe Chilean congressmen and senators, in the event that neither candidate received a majority.  
Under the Chilean Constitution, if no candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, then 
congress must select the winner of the election.  This was the case, as Allendereceiv d 36.5% of 
the vote, Jorge Alessandri 35.2% and Radomiro Tomic 28%.15  Allende’s party did not have the 
congressional votes to put him in power, without a minimum of 19 votes from the Christian 
Democratic Party.  To insure that Allende would not win, bribery of the Christian Democrat 
members of congress would be a way to keep Allende out of power.  The ultimate goal of this 
covert political maneuver was for the Chilean congress to ratify the runner- p candidate, Jorge 
Alessandri.  After Alessandri's ratification, the plan called for him to then renounce the 
presidency and create the need for a new election.  The outgoing Christian Democratic President 
Eduardo Frei could run again, and with United States assistance like the 1964 elections, defeat 
Allende.  This was the initial plan that the CIA called Track I or the parliamentary solution.  
Track I was  considered and generally accepted to be a legal and Constituti al approach to 
keeping Allende from assuming the presidency.  On September 14, the 40 committee authorized 
expenditure of this fund.   It quickly became apparent that bribery was too risky due to the 
number of officials needing to be bribed.  With such large numbers the chances of exposure were 
high.  If the plan were exposed, the anti-American sentiment that it would create within Chile 
could cause the collapse of the entire effort.16  
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            The plan to bribe members of the Chilean congress was abandoned but covert efforts to 
pressure the military and the Christian Democrats to accept and enact the “Frei re-election 
gambit” continued.  When it was realized that there was no way to get enough of the Christian 
Democrats votes to ratify Alessandri this plan was also abandoned.  Nixon knew that direct 
military intervention would lead to world condemnation and serious repercussions in the U.N. so  
he continued to push the CIA to come up with a covert plan to keep Allende from being ratified
as the winner of the election. The new plan called for current President Eduardo Frei to institute 
a self coup.  Under the plan Frei would order his cabinet to resign and replace them with a 
cabinet composed entirely of military officers.  After this, Frei would appoint an acting President 
and then leave Chile.  This would leave the country under the control of the military, and a 
Presidential figurehead.  The problem with the Frei self coup plan was that it depended on Frei’s 
total commitment to execute the plan to completion.  Frei's objection to betraying both the 
Constitution and Chile's historical tradition of non military intervention in civil rule led to the 
failure of Track I.17  
      Efforts to get Frei to set the coup plan in motion continued.  These efforts included false 
newspaper articles claiming the Communists were out to destroy Frei and h s legacy as soon as 
Allende assumed power.  Other efforts included telegrams to Frei's wife, from fake women's 
groups, asking her to save the region from communism.  The work that went into trying to keep 
Allende from being elected, and then inaugurated was nothing when compared to the eff r s of 
the CIA during the 1958 elections.  Many historians feel that there is a distinction between Track 
I and Track II.  The distinction that Track I was a Constitutional approach and that Track II was a 
military coup is erroneous.  As seen by the CIA's plan involving Eduardo Frei, Track I changed 
its focus from one of a constitutional approach to one of a coup.  Track II focused on the Chilean 
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military, in regards to identifying any current or retired officers willing to lead a coup against the 
Allende government.  Furthermore, any assistance that the United States can provide, to include, 
money, equipment, and direction would be available. CIA efforts to keep Allende from assuming 
office did not succeed.  This did not stop the Nixon administration from continuing to make 
plans for his eventual overthrow.   
     Allende was ratified as President on 24 October 1970.  Per Nixon's orders, the  CIA continued 
to develop covert plans aimed at the removal of Allende from office.  Evidence of these orders is 
seen in a secret cable, sent on the 16th of October 1970. CIA deputy director of plans, Thomas 
Karamessines, conveys Kissinger's orders to CIA station chief in Santiago, Henry Hecksher: 
 "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be 
 preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October  but efforts in this regard will 
 continue vigorously beyond this date.  We are to continue to generate maximum pressure 
 toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.  It is imperative that these actions be 
 implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG (United States Government) and 
 American hand be well hidden."18   
This secret cable was in essence, the green light to begin planning and implementation of future 
Track II operations.  The Republican party had given Truman the label of the President who lost 
China to the Communists.  Nixon was dead set on not giving the Democratic party any 
opportunity to label him the next President to lose a country to communism. Because of this 
Track II operations would continue.  
     Running concurrently with Track I, Track II operations had begun on September 9 and were 
accelerated when Nixon’s directive of September 15th was issued.  The approach was three 
pronged.  The first step was to identify, contact, and gather background information on any 
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military officers who would be willing to participate in and execute the coup plan.  The second 
step was to inform them that the United States government was committed and they would 
receive its full support short of sending in military forces.  The final step was to create a climate 
within Chile that provided an excuse for the Chilean military to overthrow Allende.19   
     The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) military attaché in Chile was Colonel Paul Wimert. 
He was used in this effort because he had established close ties with the Chilean military 
including those who might support the coup.  Wimert was advised to proceed with the 
knowledge of the Ambassador.  He accomplished his mission through the use of “false flaggers” 
or the “illegal team,” an elite team of four special agents.  These four operatives were chosen for 
the experience and ability to pose as non-United States nationals, a means that safeguarded the 
operation against exposure. False flag agents usually operated under deep cover, posing as Latin 
Americans and were used to make contacts with individuals for whom the CIA had little or no 
information, people who operated on the fringe, and whose reliability was unproven or unkn wn 
to the CIA. 
     The CIA identified five possible military candidates to lead a coup against Allende. These 
men were General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the garrison in Santiago de Chile, General 
Joaquín García, second in command of the air force, General Vicente Huerta, commander of the 
national police, Admiral Hugo Tirado, second in command of the navy, and retired General 
Roberto Viaux.20  All of the officers were informed that the United States government would 
support them before and after the coup took place.  After contacting these and a number of other 
active duty officers,  Roberto Viaux was tabbed by the CIA to lead the coup. A CIA talking 
paper notes that the “only one military leader of national stature, General Roberto Viaux, appears 
committed to denying Allende the presidency.”21  Viaux was a disgruntled commander who had 
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been retired for attempting a military coup in 1969 against Frei.  Being retired he commanded no 
troops, therefore the choice of Viaux was not without its own problems. Most active duty 
officers would not move against the Allende government due in large part to their Commander in 
Chief, General René Schneider.  Following the tradition of the Chilean military, Schneider was 
completely committed to a position of supporting the Constitutional transfer of power.  
Furthermore, General Schneider publicly supported the transfer of power to whichever andidate 
the Chilean congress would chose, including Salvador Allende. 
          Step three in Track II was an effort wherein the CIA, the United States embassy in Chile, 
and the White House set out to disrupt the tranquility of the nation and create turmoil so a “coup 
climate” would be created.  This would create major challenges for the CIA and several 
problems.  Among these problems and challenges was the fact that a large segment of the 
population was pleased and quite happy with the election of Salvador Allende.  The second 
problem was the tradition of the Chilean military to remain out of politics and support the 
Constitution.  The shining example of that was the CIA's third problem, General René Sch eider.  
Therefore it was imperative that General Schneider be removed from the equation.  Before any 
operation to remove General Schneider could be undertaken, the CIA needed to begin 
establishing a coup climate or crisis. The primary objective of this socoeconomic crisis was to 
force the military to take action against Allende, or for him to step down.  To create a climate 
that provided a pretext for the military to take action, and assist in creating a flashpoint for 
action, the CIA used a three pronged attack: economic, political, and psychological warfare. 
      Economic warfare and pressure were always seen as key components of any coup strategy – 
In the infamous words of President Nixon, he wanted “to make the economy scream."22  To 
make this happen the CIA was tasked to determine what economic tactics could be employed.  
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Actions considered included ideas such as starting rumors of food rationing to create hoarding 
and shortages; asking United States banks to halt renewal of credit to Chile; have Chile based 
United States companies halt or slow down critical items, such as spare machine parts for the 
mining industry; spreading false information about near bankruptcy of Chilean building and loan 
associations; pressuring United States companies to publically announce closur of their Chilean 
operations; and numerous other tactics.  International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and The 
PepsiCo companies were already involved in United States government plans to stop Allende.  In 
addition, the CIA was pressuring European countries with economic ties to Chile to suspend or 
slow down activities. 
      Political warfare accelerated propaganda and mobilization of CIA-controlled organizations 
and assets.  In an effort to isolate Allende’s Popular Unity Coalition, negativ  reports by 
politicians and civic leaders, anti-Allende rallies, hostile media to include newspaper, radio, and 
television, were financially supported and directed by the CIA.  Fictitious intelligence reports 
and false information about Allende’s plans, were circulated throughout the press and the 
military, all with the intent of creating a climate and pretext for a coup. 
      A rumor campaign was started based on any possible bit of information that might help 
create the coup climate.  It was suggested that false flag officers should frequent bars and plant a 
minimum of three rumors a day for ten days.  The grist for the rumor mill would be provided by 
the CIA.  The CIA was ordered to consider the use of terrorist activities against Allende’s 
followers.  The CIA documents declassified by the Clinton administration do not contain enough 
information to support the fact that terrorist activities were conducted in the effort to create the 
coup climate.  Given the world situation today and the United States' "war on ter r" he words 
“terrorist activities” have a rather profound impact.   It shows another aspect of United States 
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government hypocrisy in the fact that it would possibly encourage terrorist actions, yet 
proclaimed displeasure with terrorist actions committed by others.   
    With the 24 October Chilean Congressional vote on the election winner looming, Kissinger 
pressured the CIA to instigate a coup.  Under this extreme pressure the CIA decided that the 
solution for Track II would have to be a military action with retired General Viaux. Viaux was 
contacted through a foreign intermediary on 5 October 1970.  Two false flag agents, Anthony 
Sforza and Bruce MacMasters, served as liaison with Viaux and his people and obtaied details 
on strategy and support requirements.  In order for the Viaux operation to be successful, General 
Schneider had to be neutralized.  It was decided that Schneider would be kidnapped by the Viaux 
organization and isolated to keep him from making any statements that would keep other military 
officers from joining Viaux.  It appeared to be a good plan since it removed a powerful Allende 
supporter and would have him replaced with a Viaux coup supporter.  Additionally, the plan 
called for the  kidnapping to be blamed on leftist extremists to undermine Allende’s integrity. 
Sforza and MacMasters coordinated with members of Viaux's group to plan the kidnapping.  As 
the planning continued, Thomas Karamessines lost confidence in the ability of Vaux to 
successfully lead a coup.  In a meeting with Kissinger and Alexander Haig on 15 October 1970, 
Karamessines voiced his concern and when he stated that it was the CIA's conclu ion that "Viaux 
did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less-to launch a successful coup."23 
Furthermore, all members of this meeting agreed that Viaux had to be warned against launching 
a coup attempt at this time.  To that end a message was sent to Viaux stating: 
 "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the 
 conclusion that your plans for a coup cannot succeed.  Failing, they may reduce our 
 capabilities for the future.  Preserve your assets.  We will stay in touch.  The time will 
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 come when you with all your other friends can do something.  You will continue to have 
 our support."24  
Despite the above quoted warning, the CIA continued to meet with and support Viaux. At 2:00 
am on 22 October 1970, the CIA delivered three submachine guns to Viaux supporters.  At 
8:00am the next day, 23 October 1970, General Schneider's vehicle was struck and stopped by 
five members of Viaux's team.  Two members of the group broke the rear window, General 
Schneider pulled his sidearm in an attempt to defend himself and several  members of th  kidnap 
team fired. The severely wounded Schneider succumbed to his wounds three days later.25 
     The election of Allende to the Chilean presidency on 4 September 1970 was a moment that 
created a wave of actions in Chile, Latin America, and Washington D.C..  Frantic and frequent 
communications between Ambassador Korry and Washington became the norm.  Despite th  
efforts of the United States and the coup supporters, Salvador Allende was ratified as the 
President of Chile on 24 October 1970.  All seventy-four Christian Democrat Senators and 
Congressmen voted for Allende.  The fact that there was no “coup climate” in Chile became 
painfully evident to the  leadership of the United States government.  The United Sta s now had 
to scramble to cover up their role in the efforts to keep Allende out of office.  Nixon, Kissinger, 
Helms, Korry, Mitchell, and the CIA had to keep the world from learning of theirdevious plans.  
Orders were given to destroy evidence that could produce a trail back to the Uni ed States 
government.  The order included instructions to lie in response to any allegations of United 
States involvement and to stick with absolute denial of the facts.  The CIA fostered an 
impression that all contact with General Viaux and his group were stopped before Oct b r 18.  
By scrambling to cover up its role, the Nixon administration admitted that what it w s doing was 
wrong and in direct violation of the our own principles, values and rights.26   
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     After the Chilean congress approved Allende as their choice for President, President Nixon 
still wanted to bring down Allende.  Qureshi's thesis sums up Nixon's reasoning,  "Truman had 
lost China. Kennedy had lost Cuba. Nixon was not about to lose Chile."27  On 3 November 1970, 
Salvador Allende was inaugurated as the new Chilean President.  That same day the National 
Security Council presented Kissinger with a 21 page options paper for Chile.  This paper 
described and presented the United States objectives, and interests as well as providing four 
options, Options A, B, C, and D,  towards Chile.28  On 9 November the National Security 
Council informed the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness and the Director of Central Intelligence that United States policy 
towards Chile would fall under Option C, cool but correct posture.  These directives were issued 
under National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93).29  
     Economic pressures initiated under project FUBELT continued after Allende's i auguration.  
The first step in the economic effort to destabilize the Chilean government was to initiate what 
was referred to as an invisible blockade.  The Chilean economy was deeply dependent on 
financial, industrial, and commercial relations with the United States.  Two-thirds of the 1.6 
billion dollar foreign investment in Chile was generated by United States businesses. Prior to 
Eduardo Frei's Chileanization of copper, United States businesses owned eighty percent of the 
Chilean copper industry.  The United States government's invisible blockade, constituted total 
economic war against the Allende regime.  Chilean accounts in the United States were frozen, 
new loans from banks were stopped or deferred, Chile's world credit rating was do ngraded, and 
European countries were encouraged to adopt the same policies. The United States  pressured 
European creditors to join them in refusing to reschedule Chile's debt.  In terms of banking credit 
alone, the Chilean economy took a massive body blow.  World bank loans dropped from 31 
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million to zero, Export-Import bank loans dropped from 280 million to zero, Inter-American 
Development Bank loans dropped from 46 million to 2 million, and loans thru the United States 
Agency for International development dropped from 110 million to 3 million. United States 
corporations with assets in Chile were encouraged to drag their feet and limit their operations as 
much as possible.  A proposal was even considered to sell off the United States stockpile of 
copper in order to drive down the price. Economic pressure was considered for the Chilean
military in the hopes that it would act against Allende.  Postponement of a delivery of United 
States tanks was considered and new sales of military aircraft were processed slowly. But in light 
of the fact that the United States needed Chilean military cooperation for a coup, and in order to 
maintain contacts within the Chilean military, sales of military equipment, mili ary assistance 
and training were actually doubled.30 
     The United States attempted to isolate Chile diplomatically.  Brazil and Argentina were 
consulted in efforts to try to remove Chile from the Organization of American States (OAS).  
The very same initiative that the United States took against Cuba after Castro declared his 
Marxist allegiance.  
     Economic and political destabilization were just two parts of a three part attack under NSDM 
93. The United States budgeted seven million dollars for covert action programs for Chile.  The 
first aim was to exacerbate existing economic, political, governmental, and military tensions.  
The second leg was to divide and weaken Allende.  Activities undertaken to meet thes 
objectives were directed against the Allende coalition, Allende himself, th  Chilean military, any 
groups opposing Allende, the public and other Latin American countries. In a 
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY summary for President Nixon, Kissinger listed the five 
principal elements of the CIA covert destabilization plan to accomplish these goals.31   
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          Political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition and support to non-Marxist 
political groups and parties were two of these five principals.  Political operations included 
financial support of Chilean opposition parties for the April 1971 elections.  This included covert 
financing of the Christian Democrat Party and the National Party and other smaller parties that 
could well be a part of a coalition government.  The CIA was aware of that the business 
community was working to promote violent disorder to foment a coup.32  The business 
community had formed a group called the gr mios. The gremios were comprised of small and 
large business owners, small farmers, transportation segments of the economy to include truck 
and taxi drivers, and artisans in what was truly a multiclass organization.  Historian Thomas 
Wright argues that these groups banded together,  "To counter the threat of reform," under the 
banner of "commonality of interests among all merchants, from the major import-export houses 
to the humble shopkeeper, all farmers, manufacturers, and professionals."33  While political 
opponents were being financed and supported, the CIA looked towards maintaining and 
enlarging its contacts in the Chilean military.   
    The Chilean military was the third element of the CIA destabilization plan. The CIA Realized 
that the military was the key player in any effort to change Chile’s future, herefore, the CIA put 
extreme emphasis on covert operations targeting the military.  The emphasis was to rebuild the 
covert assets within the military after the arrests and purges that took place after the assassination 
of General Schneider.  The deceptive operations were geared to convince the military generals 
that Allende was plotting with Fidel Castro to undermine the army’s high command.  This was 
done, in part, through the use of an anti-Allende newsletter that targeted the military.  In turn, 
military officers who were strongly opposed to Allende made it known to the United States that 
they would support a coup.  It was during a visit to a United States military installation in 
Huggins 
21 
 
Panama that one such officer, army commander General Augusto Pinochet, come to the 
forefront.  In a secret CIA cable from 27 September 1972 noted that, "Pinochet, previously the 
strict Constitutionalist, reluctantly admitted he now harboring second thoughts: That Allende 
must be forced to step down or be eliminated."34 
      The final elements of the CIA plan consisted of the assistance and use of selected m dia 
outlets to speak out against Allende constituted the remaining two elements noted in the 
Kissinger memorandum.  The El Mercurio project was part of the CIA's plan to assist certain 
periodicals which could speak out against the Allende government.  The El Mercurio newspaper 
was a key outlet for the massive propaganda campaign that was part of Track Iand II.  This was 
an unyielding campaign of inflammatory articles and editorials exhorting the opposition and 
calling for an overthrow of the Allende government.  El Mercurio, in turn, received 1.95 million 
dollars.35 As Peter Kornbluh notes, “In an admission that United States covert operations had 
directly contributed to the overthrow of Allende, the CIA asserted that the propaganda effort, in 
which El Mercurio was the dominant actor, played a significant role in setting the stage for the 
military coup of September 11, 1973.”36  A role that proved to be far more effective than the 
CIA's ability to influence elections via financial support of opposition groups. 
     In the spring of 1973 Congressional elections were held in Chile. Allende's UP coalition 
gained two seats in the Senate and six seats in Congress, despite six million dollars pumped into 
opposition group campaigns prior to the election.  As a result of the elections the CIA refocused 
its attention on creating a coup climate. Adding fuel to the CIA's desire to crate a climate for a 
coup was the fact that the Chilean military had indicated that they were ready to go with the coup 
in July 1973. Once again the only thing standing in the way was the Commander in Chief of t e 
Armed Forces.  Much like General Schneider, General Carlos Prats the new Commander in 
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Chief,  was committed to upholding the Constitution and the traditional role of the Chilean 
military refraining from action in politics.  Because of this Prats was viewed as the only officer 
impeding a coup attempt.   Because of the assassination of General Schneider three years earlier, 
the CIA wished to avoid a replay with General Plats.  The plan undertaken by the CIA, was a 
massive smear campaign through El Mercurio. The plan was very successful and lead to the 
resignation of General Prats in late August.37  Thus on 11 September 1973 the coup was 
launched and in the wake of this action Salvador Allende would be dead.  Refusing to be 
captured by the military, Allende committed suicide.  The Chilean people now faced sixt en 
years of extremely oppressive rule under the military leadership led by Augusto Pinochet. 
          Thomas Karamessines words help to sum up the effect of the CIA operations when he said 
in 1975, “Track II never ended .  What we were told to do was to continue our efforts.  Stay alert, 
and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievements and of the objectives of 
Track II.  I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973.  I 
do not have any question about that in my mind."38  Karamessines' words also help to illustrate 
the United State's transition to covert influence versus overt military actions that was the 
hallmark of earlier foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth century.   
     During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, United States policy toward Latin America 
was such that overt military actions to remove governments that were not in concert with United 
States economic and political interests, were frequently authorized by United States  Presidents.  
After signing the U.N. Charter in 1948 that stressed nonintervention and respect for a nation’s 
sovereignty, the use of the CIA to assert United States influence in countries all around the 
globe, was used on a frequent basis.  The opening salvo of American hypocrisy was United 
States support of the French in reclaiming their colonies in Indochina after World a  II.  
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Hypocritical because of the words of the U.N. charter stating the rightsof self determination, that 
were also the heart and soul of its predecessor the Atlantic Charter. 
     On the Jim Lehrer PBS Online News Hour of 20 February 2001, former Chilean Foreign 
Affairs Minister Juan Gabriel Valdes spoke for the Chilean government when he said, "It is 
always shocking to learn again that the United States sent machine guns in the pouch of the U.S. 
embassy in Chile to order the kidnap of the Commander in Chief of the Chilean armed forces. 
And of course this is very important for us to know; and I think that the reaction of my 
government at the time was, and still is, that we would like to see along with the papers a certain 
sense of remorse." Later in the News Hours, Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying " This assumes 
the policy was immoral or worse, and that I don't accept. It's easy to forget what he Cold War 
was like. We thought, wrongly or rightly, we were in a life and death struggle with the Sovi t 
Union as a functioning global system."39   The Chilean people do not agree and this is just one of 
the many reasons that the United States has such a terrible image among many of the nations in 
Latin America.  It is an image that is tarnished as a direct result of our own p litical hypocrisy, 
the Cold War, and the desire of every President since Harry Truman to keep the United States in 
the spotlight of the world stage as a superpower. The actions taken by the government of the 
United States in its effort to "contain" the Soviet Union and the possible spread of communism 
completely violated the U.N. charter.  Countries around the world were allowed the right of self-
determination, as long as the government that was established was one that was friendly to the 
United States.  Governments with even the least bit of a leftward lean were undermined either 
covertly or overtly in order to establish a more "friendly" government, never mind if the 
government that was in power was doing well for its people and the welfare of its own 
sovereignty.  
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      As the history of past events begins to outlive its participants, more and more government 
documents are being declassified and released.  For many events there remains a need to balance 
national security and the safety and reputations of those involved, against the desires of the 
public and historians to have access to what the government knows.  Events like the 
assassination of President Kennedy, Roswell, and the Cuban Missile Crisis may never see their 
government sources and documents released.  In the study and research of history, primary 
source evidence, like declassified government documents are playing a larger role in the 
evolution and truth of all studies of past subjects.  In the case of my research, it played a valuable 
role in setting the record straight on U.S.  involvement.  It may also open the doors for po sible 
legal actions against those involved, similar to Spain's attempt to prosecute Allende's 
replacement, General Augusto Pinochet, for crimes against humanity.  Although declassification 
and release of government documents has provided a better understanding, by the public and 
scholars, of historical events, it appears to have done little to change government policy. United 
States interventions have led either directly or indirectly to the loss of life f thousands of people 
in Cuba, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, South Korea, Vietnam, and most 
recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This paper has shown just one of those examples.  Perhaps
current attitudes towards the United States today are a direct result of political, economic and 
military interventions in the name of freedom and democracy. But that is something for another 
paper, some other time. 
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Notes 
     1.  Early secondary sources dealing with the overthrow of Salvador Allende focus on limited 
or no involvement of the United States in the coup. These secondary sources include journal 
articles and monographs and are, Paul Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overt row of 
Allende." Foreign Affairs 52,  no.2 (1974): 322-40; Paul Sigmund "Chile: What was the U.S. 
Role? Less than Charged." Foreign Policy no.16(1974): 142-56; Elizabeth Farnsworth, "Chile: 
What was the U.S. Role? More Than Admitted." Foreign Policy no. 16 (1974): 127-141; James 
Petras and Morley Morris, "The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the 
Allende Government." (New York: The Monthly Review Press, 1975); Paul Sigmund, "The CIA 
in Chile." Worldview 19, no. 4 (April, 1976): 11-17; Paul, Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende 
and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); From 
the late 1970's to the mid 1990's more information began to leak out about United States 
involvement in the overthrow of Allende.  Secondary sources from this period begin to show a 
trend of scholars moving away from the Nixon administration party line to one of showing the 
public that the United States was indeed involved in the coup.  It is in this time period that we 
also see a change in the works of Paul Sigmund.  Sigmund originally stood adamantly behi d the 
Nixon administration, but as more information began to come to light his own works show a 
change in position. Some of these sources include, Edward Boorstein,  All de's Chile: An Inside 
View. (New York: International Publishers, 1977); Gregory Pannoni, "Overthrow of Allende: An 
Analysis of U.S. Involvement." Towson State Journal of International Affairs 13, no. 2 (Spring 
1979): 97-116; Paul Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993). During the Presidency of William J. Clinton, the Unit d States 
government released over 24,000 pages of documents relating to the United States involv ment 
in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Secondary sources after the release of these documents 
include, Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and 
Accountability. (New York: The New Press, 2004); Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration 
and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide. (New York: Verso Books, 2005); 
Lubna Zakia Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: A Study of U.S.  Involvement in the 1973 
Coup in Chile. (University of California, Berkeley, 2007). Primary sources are documents 
released during the Clinton administration.  These documents clearly show the extent of United 
States involvement and the fact that it was ordered by then President Nixon. These sources 
include, CIA Notes on Meeting with President on Chile, (1970). Available from: The National 
Security Archive at The George Washington University; CIA Genesis of Project FUBELT, 
(1970). Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; 
CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, October 16 (1970). Available from: The 
National Security Archive at The George Washington University; CIA, Cable Transmissions on 
Coup Plotting, October 18 (1970). Available from: The National Security Archive at The George 
Washington University; CIA, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with Henry Kissinger, 
Thomas Karamessines, and Alexander Haig, October 15 (1970). Available from: The National 
Security Archive at The George Washington University; CIA, Briefing by Richard Helms for the 
National Security Council, Chile, November 6 (1970). Available from: The National Security 
Archive at The George Washington University; CIA, Report of CIA Chilean Task Force 
Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18 (1970). Available from: The 
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National Security Archive at The George Washington University; Department of Defense, U.S.  
Milgroup, Situation Report #2, October 1 (1973). Available from: The National Security Archive 
at The George Washington University; Department of State Memorandum, (1970). Available 
from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; Department of State 
Cables, (1970).  Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington 
University; National Security Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97), November 3 (1970). 
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     2.  Charter of the United Nations, (2010).  
 
     3.  The theory of containment first came into being through the Long Telegram written by 
George Kennan, counselor at the Moscow embassy.  In the telegram Kennan points out the 
ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, Kennan 
argued that the Soviet Union would look out for itself and "that it would work to destroy our 
traditional way of life."3  Kennan's solution was that if the willingness to use force was made 
apparent, the Soviet Union would back down.  Later in1947 Kennan wrote an article under the 
pseudonym "X" in which he argued for "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the 
Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching  
upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."3  Hand in hand with the containment policy 
was the domino theory.  The domino theory is the belief that if a given country in any give  
region were to fall to communism, the other countries in that region would soon follow, one right 
after the other. In a speech before congress in 1947, responding to the end of British aid to 
Greece and Turkey in their fight against communism, Harry S. Truman formally announced what 
became known as the Truman Doctrine.  The Truman Doctrine established "that it must be the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures."3  The domino theory, along with the Truman 
Doctrine, was used to sway Congress in supporting United States aid to Greece and Turkey. 
Fearing the possible collapse of the European economy, which would conceivably allow the 
Soviet Union to move into Western Europe, the Truman administration devised the Marshall 
Plan.  The Marshall Plan brought stability to Western European nations, by providing economi  
aid and assistance in rebuilding devastated infrastructure. It was also seen as another step in 
holding possible Soviet expansion into Western Europe at bay.  The final piece of Soviet 
containment in Europe was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in 1948.  When combined, the domino theory, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and 
NATO can be viewed as the first steps down the road of full-fledged policy of containment. 
 
     4.  Eisenhower shared Truman's views in regards to United States foreign policy and was very 
suspicious of the Soviet Union and communism. In the mind of President Eisenhower the cold 
war was a battle between the two superpowers and their allies over ideology. Whereas Truman's 
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doctrine seemed to establish the fact that the United States would be more inclined to possible 
military intervention, Eisenhower was extremely cautious in the use of military forces for 
intervention in foreign nations.  Eisenhower's New Look Policy was a way of compromising on 
his campaign promises to stop Communist expansion by way of  'liberation' and Truman's 
containment policy.  Eisenhower's definition of liberation did not necessarily mean armed 
liberation. 
 
     5.  One impact of the Cuban Revolution was that it dramatically increased the demands for 
change in Latin America.  Historian Thomas Wright argues that "the in ensity of political activity 
increased" throughout Latin America "after Castro's victory, as new actors, new social issues, 
and more aggressive challenges to the existing order came out in force."5  Guerilla and 
revolutionary movements sprang up throughout Central and South America.  Perhaps the greatest 
impact for American foreign policy is that the Cuban Revolution challenged United States 
hegemony in the Western hemisphere.  Secondly the Cuban Revolution had provided other 
revolutionaries a proven method for ending United States dominance in their countries.   
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throughout various Latin America countries. Financial and economic aid under the Alliance for 
Progress joined with this military buildup as an instrument of containment.     
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